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t long last commodity prices have 
declined from their pre-summer highs. 
Many raw materials are now trading at 
significantly lower prices, giving temporary 
respite to industry. Red-hot copper, the 
bellwether of the metals sector, for example, has 
pulled back from its peak of $10,000 a tonne. 
Even the astronomical rise of the previously 
little-known rare earth elements has reversed. 
The prices of these much-coveted minerals 
spiked during the summer. In July, China, which 
produces over 97% of rare earths, announced its 
export quotas for the second half of 2011. This set 
the total annual quota at 30,246 tonnes. At first 
glance this appeared to be no different from the 
2010 export allowance, which stood at roughly 
30,258 tonnes. But appearances are deceptive. 
The July announcement was in fact a thinly 
disguised reduction, as ferrous alloys containing 
heavy rare earths were added to the quotas for 
the first time. In the past, companies had 
partially been able to circumvent Beijing’s quota 
system by exporting these alloys. This loophole 
has now been closed. According to the 
Australian rare earth miner Lynas, the 2011 
quota is therefore actually a 7% reduction 
compared with 2010.1 
                                                      
1 “EU says China is tightening rare-earth access even 
as sale quotas increase”, Bloomberg, 15 July 2011. 
A mistaken optimism surrounding rare 
earths… 
In this context, prices skyrocketed. Neodymium 
metal hit $450/kg, a massive increase from its 
2008 price of $27/kg. Since September, however, 
many of the rare earth elements have followed 
the trend of declining commodity prices. This 
stems from a number of factors. First, with the 
eurozone on the brink of dissolution, fears of 
another economic crisis have emerged, creating a 
bear market and leading to a commodities sell-
off. Second, high prices for rare earths have 
caused many companies to redouble their 
substitution efforts, thus decreasing demand. 
Manufacturers have switched to more available 
samarium-cobalt permanent magnets rather than 
the more effective but pricey neodymium-iron-
born ones. Toyota and General Electric are also 
planning to build vehicles with induction 
motors, which can be built without rare earth 
magnets. Third, there are high hopes that the 
rare earth supply base is expanding. Rarely a 
week goes by without the discovery of a new 
rare earth deposit, most recently in the US, Brazil 
and Afghanistan. These new discoveries have 
hyped the supply situation, fuelling the belief 
that the tight supply–demand balance is easing. 
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Decreasing commodity prices, particularly for 
rare earths, have regrettably made the outlook 
for raw materials appear far rosier than it is. This 
has led to the emergence of a certain optimism, 
which is sapping the little sense of political 
urgency that there once was. 
With regard to the rare earth elements, for 
example, Goldman Sachs claims that there will 
be a surplus by 2013. Given the pace at which 
new deposits continue to be discovered and 
mothballed mines are restarting operations, this 
is a conclusion that many now share. But as is 
often the case, the picture is actually somewhat 
more complicated. 
First, the claim that there is an imminent rare 
earths glut fails to distinguish among the 
different rare earths. While there may indeed be 
a surplus in light rare earths, such as cerium and 
gadolinium, there is still an acute supply risk for 
the rare earths used, for example, in the 
production of permanent magnets, such as 
neodymium and dysprosium. 
Second, the decrease in prices could make many 
new mines uneconomical. According to industry 
expert Jack Lifton, only a fraction of the new rare 
earth mines will actually prove profitable.2 
Third, the entire supply chain has to be taken 
into account. It is not sufficient to simply 
consider upstream mining developments. If 
downstream processing cannot keep up, 
bottlenecks appear. As previously highlighted, 
China is not only dominant in the mining and 
refining of rare earths (around 97%), it also leads 
in alloying and even the manufacture of magnet 
parts and components (up to 80% globally).3 
There is currently a dearth of non-Chinese 
processing plants. Two small separation plants 
exist outside of China, one in the US and one in 
Europe, which have a limited capacity (so far less 
than 10,000 tonnes of rare earth oxides). In 
addition, Lynas is currently developing a new 
facility in Malaysia. This plant, which was 
expected to come into operation at the end of 
                                                      
2 “Decoupling the rare earth junior mining market 
from emphasis on Molycorp and Lynas”, Jack Lifton’s 
Instablog, 3 December 2011. 
3 Roderick Kefferpütz, Unearthing China’s Rare Earths 
Strategy, CEPS Policy Brief No. 218, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, November 2010. 
2011, is facing stiff local resistance, however. 
Initially bankrolled by a number of Chinese 
organisations, campaigners opposed to the plant 
are putting up a tough fight. As a result, its 
opening has now been pushed back to next year. 
Building a downstream infrastructure outside of 
China with sufficient capacity to handle the 
expected output from new rare earth mines will 
take time. According to some estimates, it could 
take up to 15 years to have an effective rare 
earths supply chain in place that runs from mine 
to magnet. This is an important choke point not 
to be ignored. 
In the meantime, what will rare earth miners do 
once they have the relevant ores above ground? 
Send them to China for separation and refining?  
Finally yet importantly, the extreme volatility of 
the sector, the fate of which still remains largely 
in the hands of Beijing, is a wildcard that 
likewise cannot be ignored. As an example, 
northern China’s Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel 
Rare Earth Group, which is responsible for 
nearly half of the world’s light rare earth 
production, suddenly declared a one-month 
suspension of its smelting and separation work 
in mid-October in order to boost prices. Others 
were quick to jump on the bandwagon, 
including China’s southern producer, Ganzhou 
Rare Earth Mineral Industry. With falling 
demand (and with it prices) it is extremely likely 
that Beijing will announce even stricter export 
quotas for 2012 at the end of this year. The 
indication given by China’s Ministry of 
Commerce that it will not provide the largest 
rare earths producer, Baotou Steel Rare Earth 
Group, with an export license for 2012 supports 
such thinking. 
…impedes common efforts 
Regrettably, the mistaken optimism surrounding 
supplies, coupled with the eurozone chaos, is 
hampering the establishment of important 
European initiatives in this field. President 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s grand plan to stem the 
speculative tide in commodity markets met a 
rather unsuccessful end, with the latest G-20 
summit in Cannes overshadowed by Greece’s 
short-lived intention to hold a referendum on the TIME FOR A COMMON EUROPEAN EFFORT ON RAW MATERIALS | 3 
 
country’s bailout terms.4 While Germany, with a 
handful of other G-20 members, fought hard to 
include a single paragraph on the supply of 
critical raw materials in the final G-20 
communiqué, it ultimately failed to do so. These 
efforts are likely to be redoubled during 
Mexico’s G-20 presidency. Given Mexico’s 
involvement alongside the US and EU in a WTO 
case against China regarding raw materials, the 
chances of including wording on critical raw 
materials in the G-20 communiqué in 2012 might 
be better.  
Earlier this year, in its February 2011 strategy 
document on raw materials, the European 
Commission committed itself to identifying 
priority actions for its critical raw materials. Yet 
ten months on these priority actions remain 
unannounced. 
In 2010, the European Commission proposed the 
establishment of a European Innovation 
Partnership on Raw Materials. This partnership 
would bring EU stakeholders together to pool 
resources and set an innovation and R&D 
agenda. The Commission’s intention to publish a 
communication on this partnership in October 
2011, however, has yet to bear fruit, and indeed 
its future is now hanging in the balance. During 
the European Competitiveness Council meeting 
in September, a number of EU member states 
were highly critical of the initiative, putting it on 
ice. Berlin in particular has opposed the 
partnership, in spite of it enjoying strong support 
from German industry. Interestingly, a 
parliamentary resolution put forward by the 
governing coalition in the German Bundestag 
also supported the initiative, indicating that the 
government is less united in its opposition than 
first appearances suggest. Be that as it may, the 
European Commission has had to continuously 
postpone the communication on this partnership, 
which has been lying in a drawer ready to come 
out since autumn 2010. Currently, the 
Commission hopes to make its communication 
public in January 2012. Even if that should be the 
case, such a partnership is only likely to become 
operational sometime around 2014. That is rather 
                                                      
4 This in no way suggests that the eurozone should 
not be (or have been) given priority; it simply 
recognises that when dealing with urgent issues, 
other important subjects can fall by the wayside. 
late, given that other countries, such as Japan, are 
marching ahead in R&D and innovation with 
regard to raw materials. 
In the absence of such a partnership, the 
European Parliament has fortunately taken up 
the slack to some degree. The Parliament’s 
proposal for the EU’s 2012 budget includes a 
commitment of €1 million for the establishment 
of a European Competency Network on Rare 
Earths. This network would bring together 
European industry and academia to share 
information, pool resources and identify research 
gaps in relation to rare earths, leading to a 
concrete research agenda that could be financed 
under the new Horizon 2020 R&D programme in 
2014. In this context, the network could act as a 
precursor to the Innovation Partnership, which 
has continued to be blocked by member states, 
and eventually flow into the latter once it is 
operational. Industry Commissioner Antonio 
Tajani has already announced his support for 
this initiative. Given that China can boast over 
6,000 scientists and researchers working 
exclusively on rare earths, it is important that 
Europe does not fall behind in this technology 
race. 
Member states go it alone 
Part of the reason EU member states are wary of 
pooling resources and rallying behind the 
Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials seems 
to be that they are still guided by the mistaken 
belief that they can go it alone. Germany, the 
Netherlands, France, Austria and Finland have 
all put into place their own separate resource 
strategies, and others are expected to follow suit. 
Furthermore, in spite of the European 
Commission’s announcement of its intention to 
pursue European diplomacy on resources, 
Germany has taken a step further by initiating its 
own efforts in this sphere, with Chancellor 
Angela Merkel inking a framework agreement 
on raw materials with Mongolia several weeks 
ago. Namibia and Kazakhstan have also been 
identified by the German Resource Agency as 
countries with which to launch a raw materials 
partnership. None of this seems to have been 
concretely shared with the European 
Commission or the other EU member states in 
the Council formations. In addition, German 
companies supported by the government are 4 | RODERICK KEFFERPUTZ  
 
coming together to create a so-called ‘Resource 
Alliance’ that would act as an import 
consortium. 
There might, however, be a number of 
drawbacks to the pursuit of national interest at 
the expense of consolidated European action in 
this area. 
First, member states lose out on the potential 
efficiency gains that could be made through the 
pooling of resources. This is increasingly 
pertinent in the current context of tough 
budgetary restraints. 
Second, member states could actually be 
working at cross-purposes. The pursuit of 
national interest by one member state could jolt 
others into action, exacerbating a rush for 
resources. This could lay the groundwork for a 
state of affairs that – compounded by lacking 
intra-EU coordination – could be exploited by 
third countries willing to play member states off 
against each other. This has been particularly 
problematic in relation to energy supplies, 
leading the European Commission to take a 
number of precautions in this field. These 
include a recent legislative proposal that would 
require member states to give prior notification 
of any proposed energy deals with third 
 
countries, a mechanism that might usefully be 
extended to critical raw materials. The 
Commission has also been given a mandate, for 
the first time, to start commercial negotiations 
for gas supplies, in this case from the Caspian 
region. One might consider whether, under 
certain circumstances when market forces alone 
are unable to provide the necessary raw 
materials, the Commission could be given a 
similar mandate elsewhere. 
Third, individual actions by member states to 
some degree undermine EU competencies in the 
field of trade or with regard to the new European 
External Action Service. 
The lull in the raw materials markets, while 
bringing a welcome respite from high prices, has 
inadvertently led to a certain underestimation of 
the intricate challenge of securing future 
supplies. Important initiatives are being put on 
ice while member states are starting to pursue 
their own agendas with, in many cases, little 
regard to existing European competencies and 
efforts. Europe has had enough wake-up calls. It 
is time for member states and the European 
Commission to come together and face the 
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